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The key question currently driving innovations in corruption studies is 
why anti-corruption reforms do not work. The explanatory factors for 
the disappointing outcomes of anti-corruption interventions over the last 
twenty-five years include those associated with: 1) understanding and 
modelling of corrupt practices; 2) measurement and monitoring; and 3) 
policy design and implementation.
 This special issue emerges from the international seminar series on 
innovations in corruption studies in Europe and beyond held by the 
School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), University College 
London, between October 2015 and March 2016. The purpose of the series, 
which brought together researchers of the project ‘Anticorruption Policies 
Revisited: Global Trends and European Responses to the Challenges of 
Corruption’ (ANTICORRP), was to highlight innovations in the field of 
corruption studies regarding theory, methodology, analysis and policy. 
The articles in this issue represent a sample of the wider academic debates 
but focus on integrating expertise relating to Central and Eastern Europe 
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— the domain of Slavonic and East European Review (SEER) — into 
a comparative framework. The outcome reflects the openness of the 
authors to work across area and discipline and to ensure cross-fertilization 
between area studies and the social sciences in general. Such network-based 
research has been enabled by funding from the European Commission.1
 Wider ANTICORRP findings include a historical analysis of corrupt 
practices,2 how they are reflected in the media,3 how they surface in 
measurement,4 how they relate both to good governance and to organized 
crime5 and how they differ locally, regionally and globally.6 In this 
special issue, we interpret ‘corruption studies’ narrowly, meaning academic 
discourse, separate from government policy, media or activist discourses. 
Rather, we focus on the challenges in corruption studies and the emergence 
of cross-discipline and cross-area analyses in order to accommodate the 
complexity and context-bound nature of corruption.
1. The challenges of defining and modelling corruption 
One of the earlier academic definitions postulates that corruption is 
‘the intentional misperformance or neglect of a recognized duty, or 
the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some 
1  Grant No. 290529, ‘Anticorruption Policies Revisited: Global Trends and European 
Responses to the Challenges of Corruption’. 
2  Mette Frisk Jensen and James Kennedy (eds), ‘Two literature reviews on the 
pre-modern and modern categories of cases respectively’, ANTICORRP Deliverable 
D2.1, August 2013 <http://anticorrp.eu/publications/fighting-corruption-in-modernity-a-
literature-review/> [accessed 24 October 2016].
3  Paolo Mancini (ed.), ‘A comparative research on the print press coverage of 
corruption’, ANTICORRP Deliverable D6.1, June 2016 <http://anticorrp.eu/publications/a-
comparative-research-on-the-print-press-coverage-of-corruption/> [accessed 24 October 
2016].
4  Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (ed.), ‘A comparative assessment of regional trends and aspects 
related to control of corruption’, ANTICORRP Deliverable D3.2.1, February 2014 <http://
anticorrp.eu/publications/a-comparative-assessment-of-regional-trends-and-aspects-
related-to-control-of-corruption/> [accessed 24 October 2016]; Jana Warkotsch (ed.), ‘Case 
study reports on control of corruption and EU funds’, ANTICORRP Deliverable D8.2, 
February 2016 <http://anticorrp.eu/publications/eight-case-study-reports-on-control-of-
corruption-and-eu-funds/> [accessed 24 October 2016].
5  Salvatore Sberna and Alberto Vannucci (eds), ‘Integrated report on the link between 
political corruption and organised crime’, ANTICORRP Deliverable D9.1, February 2015 
<http://anticorrp.eu/publications/integrated-report/> [accessed 24 October 2016].
6  Davide Torsello (ed.), ‘Comparative country reports on institutional performance’, 
ANTICORRP Deliverable D4.1, June 2014 <http://anticorrp.eu/publications/d4-1-report-
on-institutional-performance-and-corruption/> [accessed 24 October 2016]; Lena 
Wängnerud, ‘Case studies on gender and corruption: The link between gender and 
corruption in Europe’, ANTICORRP Deliverable D5.3, October 2015 <http://anticorrp.eu/
publications/case-studies-on-gender-and-corruption/> [accessed 24 October 2016].
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advantage more or less personal’.7 Subsequent definitions have echoed 
this understanding, defining corruption as ‘behavior which deviates 
from the formal duties of a public role because of private […] pecuniary 
or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of 
private-regarding influence’,8 or simply the ‘the abuse of public office for 
private gain’.9 Irrespective of length, the conceptualizations of corruption 
are typically based on three constituents: a public official (A), acting for 
personal gain, violates the norms of public office and harms the interests of 
the public (P) in order to benefit a third party (C) who rewards A for access 
to goods or services that C would not otherwise have.10 The formulations 
may vary (see Table 1), but the principle remains.11 For most purposes, the 
definition of corruption employed by the ANTICORRP project is also 
based on the ‘particularistic (non-universal) allocation of public goods due 
to abuse of influence’,12 underlining the emphasis on public-sector activity.
Table 1. Definitions of corruption
‘TURN’ OF FOR
Betrayal Public Office/duty Private Gain
Diversion Common Good/trust Personal Interest
Ab(mis)use Communal Funds/resources Individual Benefit
Manipulation Administrative Barriers/influence Unauthorized Advantage
Exploitation Institutional Position/power Group Profit
Bending Formal Rules/regulations Informal Goal
7  Robert C. Brooks, ‘The Nature of Political Corruption’, in Arnold J. Heidenheimer 
(ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, London, 1970, pp. 56–64.
8  Joseph S. Nye, ‘Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis’, 
American Political Science Review, 61, 1967, pp. 417–27.
9  Daniel Kaufmann, ‘Corruption: The Facts’, Foreign Policy, 107, Summer 1997, pp. 
114–31. Transparency International uses an essentially similar definition of corruption as 
‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’; this, in contrast to other definitions, is also 
applicable to private-sector corruption (Transparency International Annual Report, 2011 
<http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/annual_report_2011>).
10  Mark Philp, ‘Corruption Definition and Measurement’, in Charles Sampford, Arthur 
Shacklock, Carmel Connors and Fredrik Galtung (eds), Measuring Corruption, Farnham 
and Burlington, VT, 2006, pp. 45–79.
11  Alena Ledeneva, ‘Corruption in Postcommunist Societies: A Re-examination’, 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 10, 2009, 1, pp. 69–86.
12  Valts Kalniņš, ‘Latvia: Mixed Regime with a Promise’, Anti-Corruption Policies 
Revisited: D3.28. Background paper on Latvia, edited by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, February 
2014, p. 5 <http://anticorrp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Latvia-Background-Report_
final.pdf> [accessed 24 October 2016].
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 The problem, however, with multi-faceted and context-bound practices 
of corruption is that they cannot be captured in a universal definition or 
formula. Thus, corruption tends to be used as an umbrella term for a wide 
range of complex phenomena. The more abstract a definition of corruption 
we achieve — such as ‘abuse of public office for private gain’ — the further 
we are from understanding the complex, context-bound and fluid nature 
of corrupt practices. However, contextual complexity has to be downplayed 
to enable research and measurement, often based on the ‘you know it when 
you see it’ principle. The variation in forms of corruption is often grasped 
through the perception of experts or participants, as in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (TI CPI), and through the 
construction of aggregated indices. Thus, the measure used by the Political 
Risk Services’ International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) — the third 
largest source of data within the TI CPI — is ‘more concerned with actual 
or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job 
reservations, “favor-for-favors”, secret party funding, and suspiciously 
close ties between politics and business’.13 Re-integrating context into 
defining, modelling and comparing data on corruption constitutes an 
important dimension of innovation in this special issue. 
1.1. The challenge of measurement and monitoring
Whereas the history of corruption is centuries old, the endeavour to 
measure corruption is fairly contemporary. Since the invention of the 
methodologies based on perceptions of corruption, much comparative 
research follows the assumption that corruption and its various aspects 
can be quantified and measured. It is presumed that such measurement 
can be performed not only within specific settings but also across contexts. 
Current attempts to measure corruption or corruption-perception can 
generally be divided into three main groups:14 1) surveys of households/
individuals and organizations concerning their experience of corruption; 
2) expert surveys regarding the perceived level of corruption in a specific 
country; and 3) composite indices that combine surveys of experts, civil 
servants and/or politicians.
13  Political Risk Services Group, ‘International Country Risk Guide Methodology’, 
November 2012 <http://www.prsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/icrgmethodology.
pdf> [accessed 24 October 2016].
14  For a more detailed discussion, see Stephen Knack, ‘Measuring Corruption: A 
Critique of Indicators in Eastern Europe and Central Asia’, Journal of Public Policy, 27, 
2007, 3, pp. 255–91.
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 The challenge of measurement relates to validity and reliability. Most 
scholars agree that it is neither possible nor practical to measure the 
actual volume of corruption as such. Quantifiable indicators that seek 
to measure the perceptions of corruption by a specific group of people 
and the policies implemented in order to curb corruption are considered 
approximations at best. Even if the social construction of ‘perception’ 
is left out of the discussion, the mere assumption that a complex and 
multi-faceted phenomenon could be assessed in one figure by averaging 
people’s perceptions of different types of corruption must be questioned. 
Quantitively, the corrupt practices included in the most prominent indices 
are far from unrelated and this may bias indices. Qualitative research 
into corrupt practices has established the so-called ‘equalizing effect’ of 
a number of practices legitimized by the fact that others are engaged in 
substantially similar exchanges.15
 A further and potentially even greater challenge to using composite 
indices in corruption research lies in the fact that the agencies and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) compiling them are rarely fully 
transparent about their construction. As Stephen Knack points out, the 
definition of corruption underlying the index is often not made explicit, 
neither is the exact methodology.16 Composite indices exacerbate this 
problem as they combine the results of several surveys. Sources on 
corruption are also frequently interdependent so that previous studies 
influence analyses and respondents’ answers in following years. The 
degree to which sources lack independence is impossible to determine, 
which further reduces the usefulness of indices. Lastly, the majority 
of corruption indicators lack comparability over time (none of the 
Transparency International pre-2012 indices have been set for comparison 
across countries in the same year). 
 Trends within academic discourses, however, seem to replicate the 
importance of numbers. For example, a short history of the sociology of 
corruption emphasizes the demise of counter-intuitive approaches and 
the rise of numerical comparisons.17 As the fundamental principles of 
modern scientific inquiry, measurability and universalism have shaped the 
‘global corruption paradigm’. It emerged in the 1990s, largely as a result 
15  Monika Bauhr, ‘Need or Greed Corruption’, in Good Government: The Relevance of 
Political Science, edited by S. Holmberg and B. Rothstein, Cheltenham, 2014.
16  Knack, ‘Measuring Corruption’.
17  Fran Osrecki, ‘A Short History of the Sociology of Corruption: the Demise of 
Counter-Intuitivity and the Rise of Numerical Comparisons’, The American Sociologist, 
June 2016, pp. 1–23.
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of the collapse of Communism in Europe. Other factors include the ‘end 
of history’ argument, whereby the centrally planned economic models 
have proved unviable; an increase in the number of democracies with free 
media; globalization, which has brought countries and individuals into 
closer contact; the heightened role of international organizations such as 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development; and the growing role of 
NGOs and of Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
(TI CPI). The centrality of corruption as the world’s Number One Enemy 
in the era after Communism and before terrorism, and the ‘end of history’ 
outcome of privatization and restructuring of economic institutions in 
post-Communist countries, have created a perfect setup for thinking ‘big’ 
in anti-corruption policy.18
1.2. The challenge of policy design and implementation
The increasingly high profile of indices such as TI’s CPI influences policy at 
international level and persuades politicians at national level to implement 
anti-corruption policies. Institutional frameworks are reformed with the 
expectation that the changes will lead to an improved standing for the 
respective country in the existing ranks, indices and indicators.19 
 This three-stage process (defining — measuring — controlling) 
highlights a key problem in studying and containing corruption. Policy-
interventions are often based on the assumption that corruption can be 
defined and measured, and that research results can then be translated 
into anti-corruption policy. There is an increasing number of examples 
of governmental reforms that were informed by corruption indices and 
stimulated by a desire to reduce perceived corruption — that is, to lead to an 
improvement in indicators, rather than in substance.20 As a consequence, 
some scholars now argue against the use of corruption indices for political 
or social purposes.21 
 The complexity of the context and such characteristics as a country’s 
level of economic development, political history, institutional legacies, 
ethnic make-up and socio-cultural traditions, are often ignored in policy 
18  Victorio Tanzi, ‘Corruption Around the World’, IMF Staff Papers, 45, December 1998, 
4, pp. 1–23.
19  Ledeneva, ‘Corruption in Postcommunist Societies’.
20  See examples outlined by Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government, 
Cambridge and New York, 1999.
21  Fredrik Galtung, ‘Measuring the Immeasurable: Boundaries and Functions of 
(Macro)corruption Indices’, in Sampford, Shackback, Connors and Galtung (eds), 
Measuring Corruption, pp. 101–32.
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design in favour of a ‘can do’, ‘one-size-fits all’ approach. The importance 
of context is often confused with the contested view that some cultures 
are more predisposed to corruption than others, which locks them into 
dependence on corrupt practices. Experimental evidence in behavioural 
economics dispels this myth and instead highlights the importance of 
context.22 Failures in the field of democratization — another area where 
earlier contextualized approaches gave way in the 1990s to the so-called 
‘no predisposition’ outlook — also highlight the importance of a return to 
context and complexity in order to ensure the successful implementation 
of reforms.23
 To overcome further challenges created by global, technological and 
digital developments, more nuanced approaches are needed, both in the 
academic study of corruption and in policy responses. Alina Mungiu-
Pippidi argues that successful anti-corruption reforms tend to rely on 
the assessment of a country’s development stage.24 Policy should then be 
informed by respective local norms and implemented with cooperation 
at grassroots level — even making specific non-governmental actors 
responsible for the reforms’ success. Such an approach marks a significant 
departure from the top-down approaches generally advocated and 
recommended by international agencies. The idea of integrating context-
bound complexity into the measuring and monitoring of anti-corruption 
policies is also reflected in the ‘paradigm shift’ in modelling corruption 
outlined in the next section. 
2. Policy paradigms: learning from failed anti-corruption reforms
While scholars have tried to account for the failure of anti-corruption 
reforms from different theoretical perspectives, many of them have 
stayed short of scrutinizing the assumptions of the ‘corruption paradigm’. 
Followers of a principal-agent perspective agree that the scarcity of 
resources cannot explain the failure of anti-corruption reforms.25 Rather, 
the lack of principals — be they government officials, civil society activists, 
NGOs or ordinary citizens — who are willing to enforce both new and 
22  Nina Mazar, On Amir and Dan Ariely, ‘The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory 
of Self-Concept Maintenance’, Journal of Marketing Research, 45, 2008, 6, pp. 633–44.
23  Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, 13, 
2002, 1, pp. 5–21.
24  Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment’, Journal of Democracy, 
17, 2006, 3, pp. 86–99.
25  Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, Oakland, CA, 1988; Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
Corruption: A Study in Political Economy, New York, 1978.
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existing policies appears to lie at the root of the problem.26 This consensus 
echoes the common assertion that anti-corruption reforms will not succeed 
if there is no strong political will.27 The collective action perspective 
holds that people will choose to act corruptly as long as they expect that 
most other people will also act corruptly. Even if they realize that this is 
detrimental to the collective and see it as morally unacceptable, people 
will continue to engage in corrupt practices to equalize their chances.28 In 
such settings, the cost of non-corrupt behaviour will rise since the actions 
of individuals will have no effect on the general situation.29 Consequently, 
where corruption is part of expected behaviour, implementation of any 
anti-corruption reform turns into a collective action problem. Let us look 
into this paradigm shift in more detail.
2.1 Principal-agent model
The principal-agent model30 situates the analysis of corruption at the 
interaction between principals (as bearers of the public interest) and agents 
(who might prefer corrupt transactions as long as the benefits of such 
transactions outweigh the costs). This is based on two key assumptions: 
1) that there is a conflict of interests between principals and agents and 
2) that agents are better informed than principals, leading to information 
asymmetry.31 When a principal delegates a task to an agent, the agent 
gains an opportunity to pursue his or her own self-interest and to betray 
26  Stephen P. Riley, ‘The Political Economy of Anti-Corruption Strategies in Africa’, 
European Journal of Development Research, 10, 1998, 1, pp. 129–59; Mark Robinson. 
‘Corruption and Development: An Introduction’, European Journal of Development 
Research, 10, 1998, 1, pp. 1–14; Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power 
and Democracy, Cambridge and New York, 2005; Inge Amundsen, ‘Political Corruption 
and the Role of Donors (in Uganda)’, Chr. Michelsen Institute Commissioned Report, 
Royal Norwegian Embassy, Kampala, 2006.
27  Derick W. Brinkerhoff, ‘Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts: An 
Analytical Framework’, Public Administration and Development, 20, 2000, 3, pp. 239–52; 
Michael Johnston and Sahr J. Kpundeh, ‘Building a Clean Machine: Anti-Corruption 
Coalitions and Sustainable Reform’, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3466, World Bank, 
Washington, D.C., 2004; Robert Williams and Alan Doig, A Good Idea Gone Wrong? Anti-
Corruption Commissions in the Twenty-First Century, Bergen, 2004.
28  Rasma Karklins, The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in Post-Communist Societies, 
Armonk, NY and London, 2005.
29  Donatella della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, 
and Mechanisms of Political Corruption, New York, 1999; Anna Persson, Bo Rothstein 
and Jan Teorell, ‘Why Anticorruption Reform Fails: Systemic Corruption as a Collective 
Action Problem’, Governance, 26, 2013, 3, pp. 449–71.
30  Best illustrated by the work of Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in 
Political Economy, and Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption.
31  Ibid.
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the principal’s trust. The principal-agent model rests on the assumption 
that the principal is ‘principled’ and will take on the role of controlling 
corruption.32 If the principal is corrupt and does not act in the interest 
of the public good (as in the case of state capture or legal corruption, 
for example), the principal-agent framework becomes impractical as 
an analytical tool since there is no actor willing to monitor and punish 
corrupt behaviour.33
 In the classic case — which refers to situations of bureaucratic 
corruption — the ruler is the principal and the bureaucracy is the agent.34 
‘Informational asymmetry’ occurs when the ruler cannot perfectly observe 
what happens in the field since they are remote and do not possess the 
same information that the agents have. For example, tax collectors are 
better informed about the revenue potential of a particular tax base than is 
the head of the Treasury. This creates the opportunity for bribery.
 However, recent thinking suggests that it is not only the bureaucrats 
who need to be controlled, but also the ruling elite. In this case — which 
refers mainly to situations of political corruption — rulers are modelled 
as agents and citizens as principals.35 High-ranking government officials 
may institute or manipulate policy and legislation in favour of particular 
interest groups in exchange for rent or kickbacks. This model resembles 
the classic principal-agent framework in every respect with the exception 
that, instead of assuming the presence of benevolent principals ‘at the top’, 
it takes for granted another attribute — namely, the presence of benevolent 
principals ‘at the bottom’, in the form of ordinary citizens.36
32  Fredrik Galtung and Jeremy Pope, ‘The Global Coalition against Corruption: 
Evaluating Transparency International’, in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc 
F. Plattner (eds), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, 
Boulder, CO, 1999; James E. Rauch and Peter B. Evans. ‘Bureaucratic Structure and 
Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries’, Journal of Public Economics, 
75, 2000, 1, pp. 49–71; Jens Christopher Andvig and Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, ‘Corruption: 
A Review of Contemporary Research’, Report R, 7, 2001; Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Corruption: 
Diagnosis and Treatment’.
33  Andvig and Fjeldstad, ‘Corruption: A Review of Contemporary Research’.
34  Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler, ‘Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation 
of Enforcers’, Journal of Legal Studies, 3, 1974, 1, pp. 1–18; Caroline Van Rijckeghem and 
Beatrice Weder, ‘Bureaucratic Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Wages in the Civil 
Service Affect Corruption, and by How Much?’, Journal of Development Economics, 65, 2001, 
2, pp. 307–31.
35  Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, Political Economics: Explaining Economic 
Policy, Cambridge, MA, 2000; Alícia Adserà, Carles Boix and Mark Payne, ‘Are You Being 
Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government’, Journal of Law, Economics 
and Organization, 19, 2003, 2, pp. 445–90; Timothy Besley, Principled Agents: The Political 
Economy of Good Government, Oxford and New York, 2006.
36  Roger B. Myerson, ‘Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government 
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 Regardless of how the principal-agent relationship is modelled, the 
policy implications that follow from this framework hold that, in order 
to reduce corruption, the principal should aim at reducing the agent’s 
incentives to engage in corrupt behaviour. Such incentives can most 
effectively be sustained through control instruments that decrease the level 
of discretion among agents, limit the monopoly of agents, and increase the 
level of accountability in the system. This may in turn be condensed to 
Klitgaard’s formula: ‘corruption equals monopoly power plus discretion 
minus accountability’ (C=M+D-A).37 The P-A approach to understanding 
corruption has shaped mainstream anti-corruption policies proposed by 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other international 
organizations.
 Formal institutions are not, however, the only players that can influence 
decisions over whether or not to get involved in corrupt behaviour. As the 
overall failure of anti-corruption reforms in Africa suggests, the above 
formula works considerably better in theory than in practice. It rests on 
the assumption that it is possible to identify ‘principled principals’ who 
will not be driven by the kind of rational utility-maximizing calculations 
that drive the rent-seeking actions of agents. Moreover, this approach 
cannot explain why in a given institutional setting, different individuals 
behave differently. To complicate things still further, the principal may not 
be consistent in motivation or behaviour, whereas corrupt officials can be 
differentiated on the basis of ‘quantitative morality’. The principal-agent 
approach also assumes that there is a way of designing and implementing 
new institutions that will not be sabotaged by corruption. It is here that 
collective action theory becomes relevant as an alternative analytical tool. 
2.2. Collective action model
The collective action model questions the underlying assumption that every 
society holds at least one group of actors willing/able to act like ‘principals’, 
to create proper incentives and to enforce control mechanisms for the 
‘agents’. It starts from the assumption that all actors — rulers, bureaucrats 
and citizens alike — are rational maximizers of their own self-interest. 
However, within the framework of collective action theory, rationality is 
understood to be context-bound in the sense that it is highly dependent 
on shared expectations about how other individuals will act.38 Contrary 
Corruption – A Game-Theoretic Analysis’, Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 1993, 1, pp. 
118–32.
37  Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption.
38  Elinor Ostrom, ‘A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective 
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to the principal-agent theory, the collective action theory defies the view 
that universal policies can equip agents with strategies that are most 
rational to pursue.39 Rather, it argues that the rewards of corrupt behaviour 
incentivize any rational actor to opt for such behaviour, and that individual 
strategies depend critically on how many other individuals in the same 
society are expected to engage in similar behaviour.40 Consequently, in a 
context in which corruption is the expected norm, there will simply be no 
actors willing to take on the role of controlling corruption. 
 In a context in which corruption is the expected behaviour41 the 
implementation of anti-corruption reforms turns into a collective action 
problem of the second order.42 In such settings, monitoring devices and 
punishment regimes are likely to be largely ineffective since there will 
be no actors willing to implement them. Even if most people morally 
disapprove of corruption and are fully aware of its negative consequences 
for society, few rational actors should have an interest in establishing and 
enforcing reforms.43 Hence, any anti-corruption policy based on such 
assumptions is not sustainable. 
 The conceptualization of systemic corruption as a collective action 
problem rather than as a principal-agent problem has significant policy 
implications. Following its logic the solution to curb corruption is to 
Action’, American Political Science Review, 92, 1998, 1, pp. 1–22; Robert J. Aumann and 
Jacques H. Dreze, ‘When all is said and done, how should you play and what should 
you expect?’, Discussion Paper 2005/21, Center for the Study of Rationality at Hebrew 
University, Jerusalem, 2005; Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, ‘The Economics of Strong 
Reciprocity’, in Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd and Ernst Fehr (eds), Moral 
Sentiments and Material Interests, Cambridge, MA, 2005.
39  Mungiu-Pippidi, The Quest for Good Governance; Bo Rothstein and Marcus 
Tannenberg, Making Development Work: The Quality of Government Approach, 
Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (EBA), Stockholm, 2015.
40  Toke S. Aidt, ‘Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey’, Economic Journal, 
113, 2003, 491, pp. F632–52; Olivier Cadot, ‘Corruption as a Gamble’, Journal of Public 
Economics, 33, 1987, 2, pp. 223–44; Ajit Mishra, ‘Persistence of Corruption: Some 
Theoretical Perspectives’, World Development, 34, 2006, 2, pp. 349–58.
41  Åse B. Grødeland, Tatyana Y. Koshechkina and William L. Miller, ‘Foolish to Give 
and Yet More Foolish Not to Take: In-Depth Interviews with Post-Communist Citizens 
on Their Everyday Use of Bribes and Contacts’, Europe-Asia Studies, 50, 1998, 4, pp. 
651–77; William L. Miller, Åse B. Grødeland and Tatyana Y. Koshechkina, A Culture of 
Corruption?, Budapest, 2001.
42  Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action, Cambridge and New York, 1990.
43  Dino Falaschetti and Gary Miller, ‘Constraining the Leviathan: Moral Hazard and 
Credible Commitment in Constitutional Design’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 13, 2001, 
4, pp. 389–411; Bo Rothstein, The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust and 
Inequality in International Perspective, Chicago, IL, 2011.
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design policies that change actors’ beliefs about what ‘all’ other actors are 
likely to do in such a way that most actors trust others to play fairly.44 As 
argued by Larry Diamond, endemic corruption is not some flaw that can 
be corrected with a technical fix or a political push. 45 It is the way that the 
system works, embedded in the norms and expectations of political and 
social life. Reducing it to less destructive levels — and keeping it there — 
requires revolutionary change in institutions.46 
2.3. The third way 
Heather Marquette and Caryn Peiffer argued recently that both the 
principal-agent and collective action approaches to understanding 
corruption provide valuable insights and should be applied depending 
on the context.47 They also pointed out that, while both approaches see 
corruption in wholly negative terms, people who live in systemically 
corrupt settings may perceive it as a productive strategy. This ‘problem-
solving’ understanding of corruption — which means that in some 
situations it may be the only means of satisfying basic needs — highlights 
how corruption can play a productive function in the context of weak or 
ineffective state institutions. 
 In order to overcome the simplistic models dominating contemporary 
thinking about corruption, we should turn our attention to its complexities 
and the limits of the binaries predominant in political science: corrupt/
non-corrupt, good/bad, ethical/non-ethical. The conceptualization of 
corruption through its opposites — good governance, integrity — has 
marked an important departure from universalist anti-corruption policies, 
but has in turn underpinned dualist perspectives on bad, poor or unethical 
forms of governance: rigged elections,48 the failure of politicians and state 
officials to deliver funded infrastructure,49 an unattractive climate for 
44  Paul Collier, ‘How to Reduce Corruption’, African Development Review, 12, 2000, 2, 
pp. 191–205; Douglass C. North, John Wallis and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social 
Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, Cambridge 
and New York, 2009.
45  Larry Diamond, ‘A Quarter-Century of Promoting Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 
18, 2007, 4, pp. 118–20.
46  Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment’.
47  Heather Marquette and Caryn Peiffer, ‘Corruption and Collective Action’, DLP/U4 
Research Paper 32, Developmental Leadership Program, University of Birmingham, 2015.
48  Bernd Beber and Alexandra Scacco, ‘What the Numbers Say: A Digit-Based Test for 
Election Fraud’, Political Analysis, 20, 2012, 3, pp. 211–34.
49  Miriam A. Golden and Lucio Picci, ‘Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, 
Illustrated with Italian Data’, Economics and Politics, 17, 2005, pp. 37–75.
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foreign direct investment,50 fraud and extortion in the health sector.51 
Labelling entire contexts as corrupt, and assuming that corruption plays 
a role that is a priori dysfunctional, can be detrimental for understanding 
the full range of consequences, including the latent functions that may 
be enabled by corrupt behaviour, and identifying possible drivers for 
change.52
 Experiments in behavioural economics undermine the common 
assumption that people can be divided into corrupt or non-corrupt, and 
instead point to the key importance of context. Quite simply, it cannot be 
assumed that an individual always acts with integrity. For example: a public 
official who embezzles stationery and uses a ministry car for personal 
shopping may also believe that s/he is person of integrity when it comes 
to the moral fight against the abuse of public office.53 By the same token, 
an individual may steer clear of corrupt practices not so much because of 
their moral standing, but because they are excluded from certain networks 
of trust.54
 The norms of bending the rules are defined much more by social 
circles and context than by geographical borders or personal values. 
Experiments by behavioural economists testing personal integrity have 
found no country variation. Moreover, the ‘matrix’ tests assessing people’s 
predisposition to game the system by lying point to the key importance of 
context (not necessarily the same as ‘country’), peer-pressure and what has 
come to be called ‘quantitative morality,’ whereby people cheat, but within 
limits and as appropriate, so that they can preserve their positive self-
image.55 Scholars of regional corruption have also found national surveys 
of corruption to be misleading.56 National stereotypes such as ‘Russia 
50  Aparna Mathur and Kartikeya-Singh, ‘Foreign Direct Investment, Corruption and 
Democracy’, Applied Economics, 45, 2013, 8, pp. 991–1002.
51  Taryn Vian, ‘Review of Corruption in the Health Sector: Theory, Methods and 
Interventions’, Health Policy and Planning, 23, 2008, 2, pp. 83–94.
52  Jonathan Rose and Paul Heywood, ‘Political Science Approaches to Integrity and 
Corruption’, Human Affairs, 23, 2013, 2, pp. 148–59; Cheyanne Scharbatke-Church and 
Diana Chigas, ‘Taking the Blinders Off. Questioning How Development Assistance 
is Used to Combat Corruption’, Occasional Paper, Institute for Human Security, The 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, June 2016.
53  Mark Philp, ‘Corruption Definition and Measurement’.
54  Namawu Alhassan-Alolo, ‘Gender and Corruption: Testing the New Consensus’, 
Public Administration and Development, 27, 2007, 2, pp. 227–37.
55  Mazar, Amir and Ariely, ‘The Dishonesty of Honest People’.
56  Nicholas Charron, Victor Lapuente and Bo Rothstein (eds), Quality of Government 
and Corruption from a European Perspective: A Comparative Study of Good Government 
in EU Regions, Cheltenham, 2013.
ALENA LEDENEVA, ROXANA BRATU & PHILIPP KÖKER14
is a kleptocracy’ or ‘Switzerland’s informal norm is to follow the formal 
rules’ seem to be supported by the country ratings in the TI Corruption 
Perception Index. However, given the complexity of corrupt behaviour and 
its embeddedness in context, a more appropriate answer to the question 
of whether some countries are more corrupt than others should remain 
context-bound, reflecting upon the ambivalent nature of corruption (being 
both a problem and a solution). Capturing ambivalence in measurement 
requires methodologies for complex, hard to categorize, realities.
 Future conceptions of corruption will have to transcend the binary 
oppositions between subjective and objective, public and private,57 formal 
and informal, legal and illegal,58 good and bad, prey and victim.59 
Understanding the inherent ambivalence of corrupt behaviour, the 
blurring of the boundaries and the grey zones in which it resides, its 
drivers and implications, presents a major challenge for corruption studies. 
Paradoxical concepts such as legal corruption, legislative corruption, state 
capture and business capture point in the direction of the unfitting nature 
of dichotomies for grasping the complexity of corrupt behaviour.
3. Innovative ideas in this volume
The contributions to this volume present new ideas on how to approach 
corruption studies in ways that address and help to overcome current 
deficiencies. In his analysis of existing approaches, Paul Heywood reflects 
on the studies of corruption over the last twenty-five years and calls for 
57  According to Rose-Ackerman, the very idea of a sharp distinction between public 
and private life seems alien to many people (‘Corruption and Government’).
58  The relative nature of the ‘legality’ line (whereby an identical act, depending on the 
state of legislation, can be either corrupt or non-corrupt, and it is presumed that where acts 
are not illegal, they are not corrupt) has been illustrated in the context of tax-avoidance 
practices of offshore businesses and ethical concerns expressed in the media and by 
governments in the 2014 scandals around Starbucks, Amazon and other global giants, 
who have paid up settlements, despite their arguably legal operations. The entry into force 
in 1999 of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
brought the non-corrupt act of bribing officials abroad into the realm of corruption in 
many countries. The UK Anti-Bribery Act of 2010 placed responsibility for the use of 
intermediaries in corrupt transactions on the beneficiaries of these transactions. See also, 
The Panama Papers <https://www.occrp.org/en/panamapapers/>.
59   The example ‘One does not condemn a Jew for bribing his way out of a concentration 
camp’ (Rose-Ackerman, ‘Corruption and Government’, p. 9) illustrates the point that 
only the formal transgression by the official is corrupt: thus, only the guard is corrupt, 
not the prisoner. Moreover, the guard is corrupt only because he enriches himself in the 
process. Had he simply broken the rules and let the prisoner escape, the action would not 
be corrupt according to the definition. Thus we are on the territory of double standards, 
applied to the holders of formal office but not to others.
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disaggregation. He questions oversimplified conceptualizations, dualistic 
typologies, the focus on nation-states as units of analysis and the 
insufficient differentiation of modalities of corruption. Heywood argues 
that mainstream academic research and policy-makers have devoted 
surprisingly little attention to unpacking the concept of corruption, 
leading to solutions that are doomed to fail since they are based solely 
on institutional reconfiguration. He asserts that corruption is better 
understood as a spectrum containing a number of different types of 
activities, not as dichotomies of ‘petty vs. grand corruption’, ‘need vs. 
greed corruption’ or ‘systemic vs. individual’ corruption. A thorough 
understanding and analysis of corruption is furthermore hindered by the 
fact that most research — including prominent corruption-perception 
indicators — and policy responses are focused on nation-states and 
government action. Heywood points out that globalization, too, has had 
its impact on corruption and the lack of focus on private sector action 
means that tax havens, tax evasion, capital flight and the offshore financial 
world have not been in the focus of regulation and advocacy. From this 
perspective it follows that, in order to move forward, anti-corruption 
research and advocacy must differentiate not only between types but also 
between levels of corruption. Such an approach would allow for examining 
the interdependencies between transnational developments (macro-level) 
and how nation-states operate in practice (meso-level) as well as ways in 
which corruption is experienced and practised within specific contexts 
(micro-level).
 In a similar vein of disaggregation, Claudia Baez-Camargo and Alena 
Ledeneva provide an innovative examination of the crossover between the 
public and the private sphere based on the workings of informal governance 
in Mexico, Russia and Tanzania. Their argument questions the public/
private division at the heart of the most widely used conceptualizations 
of corruption. Their research findings question the capability-building 
approach in policy. Rather than focusing on obstacles to anti-corruption 
reforms, institutional design or leadership commitment to anti-corruption, 
they explore functioning patterns of informal governance that work so 
effectively that the anti-corruption reforms do not hit their targets. The 
instruments of informal power allow authorities to stay in power and to 
give citizens access to services and resources. The authors demonstrate 
the grey zones between the public and the private spheres and identify 
practical norms that enable the seemingly effortless crossover between the 
two. The three modalities of informal governance are termed co-optation, 
control and camouflage and refer to instruments utilized, respectively: 
ALENA LEDENEVA, ROXANA BRATU & PHILIPP KÖKER16
1) to re-distribute resources and tie strategically-relevant actors to the 
regime; 2) to manage people through personalized loyalties and extra-legal 
pressure; and 3) to manipulate façades of formal (democratic) institutions 
in order to serve private interests. Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva find that 
the resilience of corrupt behaviours is associated with the underresearched 
aspects of informal governance’s normative and motivational ambivalence. 
Their findings call for a new generation of anti-corruption strategies 
grounded in political, social and economic realities rather than a transfer 
of models that have worked elsewhere. 
 Mihály Fazekas and Luciana Cingolani’s contribution to this issue 
highlights the immense potential of innovative ‘Big Data’ approaches 
in research and policy evaluation, including the field of corruption 
studies. Taking as their starting point the lack of systematic evidence 
on networks between politicians and businesspeople and their effect on 
public procurement, the authors seek to measure the magnitude of high-
level institutionalized corruption in government procurement by using 
micro-level data on some three million contracts awarded in twenty-
nine European countries between 2009 and 2014. They test competing 
hypotheses on the effect of laws on political and party financing in 
controlling corruption in procurement and in counteracting high-level 
institutionalized corruption. On the one hand, more stringent political 
financing regulations can make it harder for companies to donate to 
political parties in return for government contracts. On the other hand, 
there is evidence that incumbents strategically modify political finance 
regulations for their own benefit, simultaneously depriving political 
opponents of access to valuable resources. Thus, restrictions on political 
financing may also be associated with an increase in high-level corruption.
 Relying on statistical models, Fazekas and Cingolani find that the 
introduction of (additional) restrictions in the financing of political parties 
does not measurably curb the risk of high-level corruption. On the contrary, 
it increases the risk — irrespective of whether financing regulation is taken 
into account as a whole or according to its constituent parts. The authors 
also argue that, if laws are changed shortly before national elections, this 
can lead to a decrease in corruption levels after the elections. As such, their 
findings cannot provide a definitive assessment of the effectiveness of laws 
governing the financing of political parties, yet they point to a number of 
subsequent opportunities for research, for example in the area of policy 
implementation, the time needed for achieving regulatory impact, and the 
effect of institutional inter-dependencies.
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 Roxana Bratu, Dimitri Sotiropoulos and Maya Stoyanova test the 
transfer of anti-corruption policies in a context-sensitive comparative 
study of Bulgaria, Greece and Romania. They shed light on the complex 
interaction between the emergence of corruption as a major social 
problem and the implementation of anti-corruption policies. Comparing 
the Bulgarian, Greek and Romanian contexts, they analyse the way in 
which similar anti-corruption policies have produced different outcomes. 
Their multi-methods framework combines qualitative interviews with the 
analysis of official documents and ample secondary data. All three countries 
have experienced vilification by the EU due to widespread and pervasive 
corrupt practices that were subsequently targeted by the imposition of 
blanket policies relying on Western-centric definitions of corruption. 
However, as activists and academics have pointed out, such one-size-fits-
all approaches have not been successful in reducing corruption since they 
have ignored country-specific historical and cultural factors. The authors 
employ a social-constructionist view to uncover a number of trends in 
anti-corruption policy-formation. While some of these trends appear at 
first glance to be contradictory, Bratu, Sotiropoulous and Stoyanova show 
how they are nonetheless interconnected by examining the emergence, 
role and practice of anti-corruption in their respective contexts. Thereby, 
a particular focus is placed on the ways in which ‘grand corruption’ is 
conceptualized, institutionalized and tackled. They argue that anti-
corruption measures are not merely a technical solution to an equally 
technical problem, but also an agency in the production of contemporary 
political culture.
 To illustrate their argument, Bratu, Sotiropoulous and Stoyanova devise 
a schema to describe anti-corruption policy in each country in terms 
of evolution, institutions, implementation and politicization. Greece is 
presented as a case of ‘unreflective accommodation’ where anti-corruption 
is primarily implemented on the basis of de-contextualized international 
advice. Bulgaria shows a ‘reactive legitimation’ of anti-corruption where 
the problem is acknowledged but a significant implementation gap 
exists. Romania exhibits a ‘proactive assimilation’ of practices and thus 
emerges as the most promising case. Although imperfect, anti-corruption 
policies have in Romania become the top priority for policy-makers and 
prosecutors and illustrate the potential of ‘proactiveness’ that may serve as 
a template for other countries.
 The combination of proactive leadership and a bottom-up, context-
bound approach seems to be effective in tackling corporate corruption. The 
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article by Stanislav Shekshnia, Alena Ledeneva and Elena Denisova-Schmidt 
seeks to identify agency for change in systemically corrupt environments. 
Building on a study of 110 company owners and directors, they search 
for political will among corporate leaders, test a new ethnographic 
approach to managing corruption at the level of the firm, and evaluate 
the effectiveness of a variety of mitigation strategies. Taking Russia as an 
example of a systemically corrupt environment, the article endeavours to 
offer insights for practitioners on how to ‘manage’ corruption, that is, how 
to devise and implement strategies that effectively mitigate corruption-
related risks. Using a sequential multi-step research design, the authors 
first engage in exploratory analysis to identify and validate the prevalence 
of corrupt practices mentioned in academic literature and media reporting. 
The findings then provide the basis for in-depth interviews. Shekshnia, 
Ledeneva and Denisova-Schmidt identify four prevailing attitudes towards 
corruption held by Russian business leaders: toleration (held by a majority 
of respondents), exploitation, avoidance and management of corruption 
(synonymous with proactive leadership).
 The authors assert that anti-corruption strategies at the level of the firm 
must target specific non-compliant practices. They propose a simple, yet 
comprehensive four-step approach that allows business leaders to identify 
suitable targets. They stress that while target practices are best identified 
bottom-up, willing corporate leaders implement mitigation strategies 
top-down. Systemically corrupt environments are generally conducive 
to tolerance and passive attitudes towards corruption among business 
leaders, yet preventive and controlling leadership action via formal 
hierarchies as well as informal networks can nevertheless provide for 
effective ‘management’ of corruption despite the pressures of the corrupt 
environment. The article concludes by recommending ‘action points’ for 
senior business leaders in systemically corrupt environments which can 
also be used for leadership training.
4. Conclusion
The contributors to this special issue of the Slavonic and East European 
Review share the belief that, despite great advances in corruption studies 
over the last three decades, there is still a lot to learn about corruption 
and anti-corruption policies. All the articles present specific contributions 
to academic debates and policy discourse about corruption and anti-
corruption measures, questioning established practices and thereby 
pushing the boundaries of theoretical perspectives. That is not to say that 
CORRUPTION STUDIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 19
this volume claims to present a final answer to the questions it addresses. 
The authors differ in their theoretical and methodological approaches, 
highlighting the variety of perspectives from which corruption and 
informal practices may be studied, explained and understood. It is 
not necessary for scholars and policy-makers to agree on a single 
conceptualization or measurement of corruption. It is more important that 
they are able to come up with context-sensitive policies that accommodate 
and adjust to the complexity of local environments. 
 The ANTICORRP project has proved successful in expanding research 
networks and producing novel policy recommendations. Questions 
nevertheless remain regarding the failure of anti-corruption policies and 
how to deal with corruption as a complex, dynamic and often contradictory 
phenomenon. Some promising new avenues respond to the puzzles in anti-
corruption research and policy. For instance, how can we analyse practices 
of ‘camouflage’ where selective law-enforcement and misuse of the law 
are masked among the law’s regular exercise and application? Corruption, 
where it is part of the system, is driven by a number of factors that are 
difficult to disentangle, but which include social pressure to engage in 
corruption and citizens’ fear of the criminal justice system. Anticorruption 
activists also point out that classic anti-corruption programming misses 
some key elements that drive corruption. The majority of anti-corruption 
measures focus primarily on the enablers of corruption (lack of oversight 
and citizen knowledge) and respond by creating capacity for oversight and 
funds for the anti-corruption sector.60 Yet such policies miss out on those 
contextual situations in which corruption can be seen as a mechanism 
of last resort to ameliorate structural disadvantages. There emerges a 
new generation of policies based on new indicators, oblique, or indirect 
approaches,61 ‘nudge’ thinking62 and collective-action logic63 that make it 
possible to integrate context into analysis. Thus, in their as yet unpublished 
research Allan Sikk and Philipp Köker show how the turnover of electoral 
candidates in Central and Eastern Europe is associated with variations 
in corruption perceptions.64 A rich new line of investigation developed 
60  Cheyanne Scharbatke-Church and Diana Chigas, ‘Facilitation in the Criminal 
Justice System: A Systems Analysis of Corruption in the Police and Courts in Northern 
Uganda’, Occasional Paper, Series 1, Number 2, September 2016, Institute for Human 
Security, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
61  John Kay, Obliquity: Why our Goals are Best Achieved Indirectly, London, 2011.
62  Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, 
Wealth and Happiness, London, 2008.
63  Heather Marquette and Caryn Peiffer, ‘Corruption and Collective Action’.
64  Allan Sikk and Philipp Köker, ‘Rejuvenation or Renomination? Corruption and 
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by Roxana Bratu and Iveta Kazoka uncovers the complexity of this 
phenomenon by looking at the metaphorical representations of corruption 
in the media.65
 Further research into policies capable of accommodating complexity 
is being supported by the British Academy and the UK Department 
for International Development Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) 
Partnership.66 Comparative research into informal governance, unwritten 
rules and informal practices will be conducted in East Africa and Central 
Asia. The Horizon 2020 INFORM project, ‘Closing the Gap between 
Formal and Informal Institutions in the Balkans’67 and the UCL-based 
study of social and cultural complexity, Global Informality Project,68 focus 
on the role of informality in corrupt environments. While we may not (yet) 
be fully equipped in terms of conceptual tools, measurement instruments 
and policy-thinking to accommodate the complexity of contexts in which 
corruption is grounded, this special issue aims to present at least a selection 
of new avenues and thereby feed into the on-going discussion of the new 
generations of anti-corruption policies.
Candidate Turnover in Central and Eastern Europe’, unpublished paper prepared for 
presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Philadelphia, 1–4 September 2016.
65  Roxana Bratu and Iveta Kazoka, Narratives of Evil: Localized Understandings of 
Corruption <http://anticorrp.eu/publications/narratives-of-evil-localized-understandings-
of-corruption/> [accessed 24 October 2016].
66  British Academy and UK Department for International Development, Anti-Corruption 
Evidence Partnership <http://www.britac.ac.uk/anti-corruption> [accessed 24 October 
2016].
67  See <http://www.formal-informal.eu> [accessed 24 October 2016].
68  ‘The Global Informality Project — The First Online Multimedia Resource on Informality’ 
<http://in-formality.com> [accessed 24 October 2016].
